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JURISDICTION 
Appellants Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc. 
(collectively "Larsons") initially appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(3)(j). The Supreme Court 
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2-3(4). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
district court erred in dismissing Larsons' complaint as untimely 
under the applicable statutes of limitation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court should apply the same analytical standard as 
that applied by trial court on a motion for summary judgment and 
should review the trial court's legal conclusions for correct-
ness. Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-25(1) & (3): 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obliga-
tion, or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing . . . . 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-26(2): 
Within three years: 
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or 
injuring personal property, including actions 
for specific recovery thereof . . . . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b): 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in 
law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
. . . If, on a motion asserting the defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all mate-
rial made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b) & (c): 
(b) For defending party. A party 
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. 
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
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file, together with the affidavits, if anyf 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . 
• • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Larsons filed this action in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County on June 24, 1987 alleging 
breach of an oral contract, interference with business relation-
ships, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conver-
sion. Stephen Wade, Bryce Wade, Kipp Wade, dba SBK; and Valley 
Ford (collectively "Wades") responded by filing a motion to dis-
miss on the grounds that the various claims were barred by appli-
cable statutes of limitation. The motion to dismiss was based on 
the statements in the Larsons' complaint that the actions of the 
Wades upon which the various causes of action were based occurred 
prior to or concurrent with a specific event — the filing of a 
creditor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bank-
ruptcy proceeding, In re Larson Ford Sales, Inc., Bankr. No. 
82C-02186, before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah (hereinafter "Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy"). The 
Wades established by affidavit that the filing of the creditor's 
plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy 
occurred more than four years prior to the date the Larsons 
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commenced their action. The Larsons filed an affidavit in oppo-
sition that did not controvert the fact that the creditor's plan 
of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy was filed 
some time prior to June 10, 1983, the date upon which the bank-
ruptcy court confirmed the creditor's plan. In July 1988, the 
court, treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment, dismissed the amended complaint as barred by the appli-
cable statutes of limitation as a matter of law. 
The Larsons filed a "Notice of Extension of Time to 
Appeal" one day after the expiration of the thirty (30) day 
appeal period. The district court denied the motion for an 
extension. The Larsons appealed the denial of the motion for an 
extension to the Utah Supreme Court, which reversed the denial in 
an unpublished ruling. The Larsons thereafter brought this 
appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Larsons filed their complaint on June 24, 1987. 
The Larsons filed a First Amended Complaint ("amended complaint") 
on July 9, 1987. R. 11. 
2. The amended complaint alleges four causes of 
action: 
First Cause of Action — Breach of Contract 
Second Cause of Action — Interference with Business 
Relations 
5 
Third Cause of Action — Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
Unjust Enrichment and 
Conversion 
Fourth Cause of Action — Punitive Damages. 
R. 13-18. 
3. The claims in the amended complaint all arose from 
an alleged January 1983 oral agreement between Stephen Wade and 
the Larsons in which Wade allegedly agreed to purchase Larson 
Ford Sales, which was then in a chapter 11 bankruptcy, from 
Walter Larson, and to take certain actions in connection with the 
purchase, including filing and obtaining confirmation of a debt-
or's Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of reorganization on behalf of 
Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy. Amended complaint, 1111 4 & 5; R. 
12-13. 
5. In their second cause of action, the Larsons allege 
that after the Wades breached the oral contract, the Wades 
tortiously interfered with a contract the Larsons had entered 
into with another party to purchase Larson Ford Sales: 
Subsequent to the breach of contract by WADE as 
set forth in the First Cause the Plaintiffs negotiated 
an agreement with a partnership known as HGBH . . . . 
(Amended complaint, 11 10); 
Defendant STEPHEN WADE, having breached his agree-
ment with Plaintiff, conspired with and induced the 
HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide 
like benefits. (Amended complaint, 1111 10 & 13.) 
R. 15 (emphasis added). 
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6. The Larsons' amended complaint states that both the 
breach of the oral contract and the interference with business 
affairs occurred prior to the submission by the Wades of a credi-
tor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy. 
Paragraph 13 of the amended complaint states: "This breach of 
HGBH was induced in order that defendant Stephen Wade could sub-
mit a creditor's plan in Chapter XI [sic] bankruptcy." R. 15. 
(emphasis added). 
7. The third cause of action alleges that the Wades 
were unjustly enriched and converted personal property of Larson 
Ford Sales through a breach of fiduciary duty. In paragraph 17, 
the amended complaint states: 
The Defendant having received the confidential 
data and information about the operation of LARSON FORD 
SALES, INC., did utilize said information such that 
based upon a claimed debt of $130.12 did submit a con-
trary and adversary Plan to the Plaintiff's plan as a 
creditors[sic] plan to the bankruptcy court which plan 
violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiff 
and defendants . . . . 
R. 17 (emphasis added). 
8. The remaining fourth cause of action seeking puni-
tive damages for intentional and malicious conduct is based upon 
the conduct of the Wades alleged in the first three causes of 
action. R. 17-18. 
9. The Larsons' complaint states that the filing of 
the creditor's plan of reorganization was a breach of the oral 
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agreement. Amended Complaint, f 17; R. 17. The creditor's plan 
of reorganization referred to in the amended complaint was filed 
by Stephen Wade, Inc. in the early spring of 1988. Affidavit of 
Stephen Wade 113; R. 40-41; Affidavit In Opposition To Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss (hereinafter "Affidavit of Walter Larson") 114; 
R. 50. 
10. In support of their motion to dismiss, the Wades 
submitted the Affidavit of Stephen Wade. The affidavit estab-
lished the following facts: 
a) Stephen Wade was president, director and the 
principal shareholder of Stephen Wade, Inc. 
b) Stephen Wade, Inc. submitted a creditor's plan 
of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy 
in early spring of 1983, and on June 1, 1983, submitted 
a second amended plan of reorganization; 
c) The bankruptcy court confirmed the second 
amended creditor's plan of reorganization on June 10, 
1983; and 
d) Notice of confirmation of the creditor's plan 
of reorganization submitted by Stephen Wade, Inc. was 
mailed to all parties in interest in the Larson Ford 
Sales bankruptcy on June 10, 1983. R. 40-41. 
8 
12. In response to the motion to dismiss, the Larsons 
did not controvert the fact that the creditor's plan of reorgani-
zation was filed in the spring of 1983, or that the bankruptcy 
court had confirmed the creditor's plan of reorganization on June 
10, 1983. Instead, the Larsons filed an affidavit to the effect 
that Walter Larson did not learn of a breach of the oral agree-
ment until June 24, 1983, that Stephen Wade, Inc. was not a party 
to the alleged oral contract, and that Larson only learned of the 
disappearance of collateral pledged on Larsons' SBA loan eigh-
teen months after June 24, 1983. R. 49-50. 
13. The district court treated the motion to dismiss 
as a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, 
holding that on the undisputed facts, plaintiff's claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When a complaint on its face alleges that the causes of 
action arose prior to a specific date that would make the claims 
time barred under applicable statutes of limitations, summary 
judgment is appropriate. The allegations contained in the 
Larsons' amended complaint, on their face, state that any breach 
of the alleged oral contract or tortious conduct by the Wades 
occurred prior to or concurrent with the filing of a creditor's 
plan of reorganization in the Larsons Ford Sales bankruptcy. The 
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Wades established the uncontroverted fact that the creditor's 
plan of reorganization was filed sometime before June 10, 1983, 
which was more than four years prior to the date the Larsons 
filed their complaint. The amended complaint specifically states 
that the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization was a 
breach of the contract, and also repeatedly states that the oral 
contract was breached sometime prior to the filing of the credi-
tor's plan of reorganization. The statute of limitations did not 
commence running from the date the Larsons' claim to have discov-
ered any breach of the agreement or the alleged tortious conduct, 
but from the date of the breach or intentional tort, which was no 
later than June 10, 1983. 
A statute of limitations for intentional torts such as 
those alleged in the Larsons' amended complaint begins to run 
with the tort or activity leading to the damage, not upon the 
occurrence of the last injury or damage. The statute of limita-
tions begins to run on a tort arising directly from a contractual 
relationship at the time the contract was breached. 
The Wades did not waive their right to assert a statute 
of limitations defense by filing a motion to dismiss. The motion 
to dismiss and supporting memorandum specified the statutes on 
which the Wades relied and clearly placed the Larsons on notice. 
Finally, the bankruptcy pleadings from 1983 that the Larsons 
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failed to place in the record before the trial court are not rel-
evant. The complaint's plain allegations state that the causes 
of action arose prior to or concurrent with the filing of the 
creditor's plan of reorganization, which, by undisputed evidence, 
was sometime prior to June 10, 1983. The claims are barred under 
applicable statutes of limitation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ACCORDING TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE LARSONS' OWN COMPLAINT, 
THE CONDUCT UPON WHICH THEY BASE THEIR CLAIMS OCCURRED NO 
LATER THAN THE TIME OF FILING THE CREDITOR'S PLAN OF 
REORGANIZATION. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on 
the first cause of action for breach of the oral agreement 
because the alleged conduct occurred more than four years prior 
to the filing of the Larsons' complaint. Any such claim is 
time-barred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(1). 
When a complaint alleges that the conduct upon which 
its various claims are based all occurred before a specific date 
which is outside the limitations period, the defendant is enti-
tled to summary judgment. Commercial Equity Corporation v. 
Majestic Savings and Loan Association, 620 P.2d 56 (Colo. App. 
1980) (summary judgment upheld where complaint alleged that con-
duct giving rise to wrongful foreclosure, tortious interference 
with contract, conversion and other claims occurred prior to spe-
cific date outside limitations period). In the instant case, the 
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conduct upon which each of the claims was based is alleged to 
have occurred prior to or concurrently with the filing of a cred-
itor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales bank-
ruptcy. It is an undisputed fact that the creditor's plan was 
confirmed on June 10, 1983, establishing that plaintiffs' claims 
arose more than four years prior to June 24, 1987, the date the 
Larsons commenced this action. 
A. The Filing Of The Stephen Wade, Inc. Creditor's Plan Of 
Reorganization Breached The Oral Agreement. 
The Larsons' attempt to circumvent the statute of limi-
tations by arguing that Stephen Wade, Inc., the proponent of the 
creditor's plan, was not a party to the oral agreement. Brief of 
Appellant at 11. The first amended complaint belies the Larsons' 
argument that the Stephen Wade, Inc. plan was not a breach of the 
alleged oral agreement. Paragraph 17 of the amended complaint 
states that the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization 
"violated the contractual agreement between Plaintiffs and Defen-
dants." R. 17. It is clear from both the complaint and Walter 
Larson's affidavit that the Larsons viewed the filing of a credi-
tor's plan of reorganization by Stephen Wade, Inc., an entity 
which Stephen Wade controlled as president, director, and princi-
pal shareholder, (R. 40), as a breach of the oral agreement. 
The Larsons argue that the Wades are required to show 
that the plan of reorganization breached the oral contract and 
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the omission of the plan from the record is therefore "curious." 
(Appellant's Brief at 12.) The Larsons conveniently forget that 
their own complaint states emphatically that creditor's plan 
"violates the contractual agreement between plaintiff and defen-
dants." R. 17. The contention on page 12 of Larsons' brief to 
that the plan might not be a breach totally flies in the face of 
what Larsons alleged in their own complaint. 
The Larsons seem to forget that their complaint admit-
ted the facts upon which the district court based its ruling. 
Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings , depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits" show there is no material 
issue of fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)(emphasis added). Parties 
are bound by the allegations or admissions of their pleadings. 
Dailev v. Barnhart, 768 P.2d 907, 909 (Okla. App. 1988). A spe-
cific allegation in a complaint is a judicial admission of the 
fact alleged. Kula v. Karat, Inc.. 91 Nev. 100, 531 P.2d 1353, 
1356 (1975); Taylor v. Pearl, 249 Or. 611, 439 P.2d 7 (1968). 
Furthermore, the confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc. 
creditor's plan was, as a matter of law, a breach of the alleged 
oral contract. The Larsons' argument that Stephen Wade, individ-
ually, could have performed under the oral contract subsequent to 
confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc. creditor's plan 
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(Appellant's Brief at 12) has no basis in law. The Bankruptcy 
Code provides that "the court may confirm only one plan." Id. S 
1129(c). The fact that Stephen Wade, individually, allowed a 
creditor's plan to be confirmed in contravention of his alleged 
contractual obligation to obtain confirmation of a debtor's plan, 
was a breach of the oral agreement. 
The confirmation of the Stephen Wade, Inc. plan was a 
breach for the additional reason that Stephen Wade was the con-
trolling person of that entity. Where a party, by a voluntary 
act, by his own conduct, causes failure of performance, the party 
has breached the agreement. See Cannon v. Stevens School of 
Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977). As president, 
principal shareholder, and director of Stephen Wade, Inc. (R. 
40), Stephen Wade, individually, had control over the acts of his 
corporation. Stephen Wade, Inc.'s obtaining confirmation of a 
bankruptcy plan of reorganization was, therefore, an action in 
the control of Stephen Wade, which made performance of his obli-
gations under the contract impossible. There is therefore no 
question that if there was such a contract, Stephen Wade breached 
it no later than June 10, 1983. 
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B. Whatever Its Nature, The Breach Of The Oral Contract 
Occurred Prior To The Date Of Filing The Creditor's 
Plan Of Reorganization. 
As stated above, the Larsons' argument that the filing 
of Stephen Wade, Inc.'s creditor's plan of reorganization was not 
a breach of contract is inconsistent with the statements in the 
complaint that the filing was a breach. Further, the Larsons' 
contract claims are also barred because the Larsons' complaint 
repeatedly states that the Wades breached the oral contract prior 
to the submission of the creditor's plan of reorganization in the 
Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy. 
Paragraph 4(d) of the amended complaint states that the 
January 1983 oral agreement for the purchase and acquisition of 
Larson Ford Sales required the Wades to file and obtain approval 
of a debtor's plan of reorganization in the Larson Ford Sales 
bankruptcy: 
(d) Defendants agreed to submit on behalf of 
LARSON FORD SALES, a debtor's plan in the Chapter XI 
Bankruptcy and obtain approval thereof at no cost to 
WALTER P. LARSON. Such plan to include payment of 
$175,000.00 to WALTER P. LARSON. 
R. 12 (emphasis added). 
Paragraph 10 of the amended complaint states that 
,f
 [subsequent to the breach of contract by WADE as set forth in 
the First Cause, the Plaintiffs negotiated an agreement with a 
partnership known as HGBH . . . ." R. 15 (emphasis added). The 
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Larsons then allege that "Defendant STEPHEN WADE, having breached 
his agreement with the Plaintiff, conspired with and induced the 
HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide like bene-
fits. This breach of HGBH was induced in order that the Defen-
dant STEPHEN WADE could submit a creditor's plan in Chapter XI 
Bankruptcy." Amended complaint, 11 13; R. 15 (emphasis added). 
The date of confirmation of the creditor's plan of reorganization 
therefore becomes a reference point prior to which time the 
alleged conduct giving rise to the Larsons' claims must have 
occurred. 
On its face, the complaint states that the breach 
occurred prior to the submission of the creditor's plan. The 
uncontroverted fact that the creditor's plan of reorganization 
proposed by Stephen Wade, Inc. was confirmed on June 10, 1983 
(and the date notice was mailed to all interested parties), 
leaves no doubt that the alleged breach of contract occurred 
sometime prior to June 10, 1983. Thus, the breach of contract 
claim is barred under Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-25(1). 
C. The Larsons' Tort Claims Are Also Time Barred Because 
The Facts Alleged Occurred More Than Four Years Prior 
To The Date Of The Larsons' Complaint. 
The claims for tortious interference with business 
relations, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and con-
version contained in the Larsons' second and third causes of 
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action are barred by the four year statute of limitations of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3).- The Larsons allege in paragraph 13 of 
the amended complaint that Stephen Wade "conspired with and 
induced the HGBH partnership to breach their contract to provide 
like benefits. This breach of HGBH was induced in order that the 
Defendant STEPHEN WADE could submit a creditor's plan in Chapter 
XI Bankruptcy." R. 15 (emphasis added). This conduct, by 
Larsons' own admission (see supra at 13), all occurred prior to 
the June 10, 1983, confirmation date. 
The Larsons' breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrich-
ment, and conversion claims are also barred based upon the alle-
gations of the complaint. The amended complaint states that "in 
the process of and concurrent with negotiations involved in the 
contract referred to in the first cause of action herein, the 
plaintiff made available to the defendant confidential data and 
information in order that the defendant could formulate and pro-
vide a debtor-in-possession plan for the Larson Ford Sales Chap-
ter XI plan of reorganization." Amended Complaint, 11 15 (empha-
sis added). (R. 16). The Larsons then allege that the Wades 
i/ While the court below based its dismissal of all claims on a 
four year statute of limitations, the three year limitation 
of § 78-12-26(2) applies to the conversion and unjust 
enrichment claims. This point makes no difference in this 
case because the Larsons' claims arose more than four years 
prior to the commencement of the case. 
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breached the fiduciary duty by utilizing the confidential infor-
mation to "submit a contrary and adversary Plan to the Plain-
tiff's plan" to unjustly enrich the Wades and convert the 
Larsons' property. Amended Complaint, If 17; R. 17. These claims 
are therefore based upon conduct which occurred at the time of 
submission of the creditor's plan of reorganization. The claims 
are barred under the four year statute of limitations of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
D. The Larsons' Punitive Damages Claim Is Time Barred. 
The punitive damages claim for intentional and mali-
cious conduct alleged in the Larsons' fourth cause of action is 
based upon the same conduct as the first three causes of action. 
R. 17-18. The claim therefore is barred by Utah Code Ann. SS 
78-12-25 and 78-12-26. 
II. THE AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER LARSON DOES NOT CREATE MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF FACT. 
The Larsons argue that they are entitled to four infer-
ences from the affidavit of Walter Larson. Appellants' Brief at 
13-14. None of the "inferences" reasonably arise from the Walter 
Larson Affidavit (R. 49-50) or the pleadings. One cannot reason-
ably infer that the Stephen Wade, Inc. creditor's plan of reorga-
nization did not breach the alleged oral agreement when the 
amended complaint states that it did. (Amended Complaint, H 17; 
R. 17.) Likewise, the Larsons are not entitled to an inference 
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that the alleged contract was not breached until June 24, 1983 
when there are numerous statements in their amended complaint 
that the breach occurred prior to the filing of the creditor's 
plan of reorganization. (Amended Complaint, HH 10, 13 & 15; R. 
15-16.) Furthermore, there is nothing in the pleadings, the 
affidavit of Walter Larson, or elsewhere in the record that could 
support an inference that the Wades wanted Larson to have no 
knowledge of any breach because of doubts as to whether Stephen 
Wade, Inc. could proceed with its plan of reorganization. The 
cursory affidavit of Walter Larson speaks for itself. Walter 
Larson does not even address the date of any breach of conduct 
or tortious conduct, only the date he discovered it. 
Incredibly, the Larsons argue in their brief that 
"[t]he only overt act of any party to the contract alleged in 
this suit is the order evicting Walter P. Larson from the pre-
mises of the Larson Ford dealership." Appellants' Brief at 14. 
The Larsons cannot sweep aside the numerous allegations of overt 
acts and breach of contract in their amended complaint as dis-
cussed in Part IA above. 
No issue of fact arises from the statement in Walter 
Larson's affidavit that the creditor's plan of reorganization was 
filed by Stephen Wade, Inc., who was not a party to the alleged 
contract. Brief of Appellant at 13-14. The statement does not 
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contradict the Wades' position, and is, in fact, consistent with 
the affidavit of Stephen Wade filed in support of the motion to 
dismiss. R. 41. As discussed in Section IA above, the Larsons' 
argument that Stephen Wade, Inc.'s filing a creditor's plan of 
reorganization could not have been a breach of the oral agreement 
ignores the specific statement,in paragraph 17 of the amended 
complaint (R. 17) that filing the creditor's plan was a breach. 
Further, whatever the nature of the breach of the alleged agree-
ment, the Larsons' are bound by the numerous statements in their 
complaint that the conduct giving rise to the claims occurred 
prior to the date the creditor's plan of reorganization was 
filed. 
The statement in Walter Larson's affidavit that he 
first learned of a breach of the oral agreement on June 24, 1983, 
and that Larson did not learn that the SBA loan collateral com-
pletely disappeared until eighteen (18) months later, does not 
create material issues of fact. Mere ignorance of the existence 
of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute 
of limitations. Briqham Young University v. Paulsen Construction 
Company, 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987). Moreover, the Larsons' com-
plaint would have been untimely even if the the so-called "dis-
covery" rule applied to an action for breach of an oral contract: 
The discovery rule has no application when an action 
easily could have been filed between the date of 
discovery and the end of the limitation period. 
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Id, at 1374c Walter Larson's affidavit indicates that he was 
fully aware of all of his claims more than two and one-half years 
before the expiration of the four year statutes of limitation. 
The fact that Walter Larson's affidavit indicated that 
some of the damage from the alleged tortious conduct may not have 
occurred until sometime in 1984 does not create a material issue 
of fact with respect to the commencement of the statute of limi-
tations. The statute of limitations in the case of a willful, 
intentional tort begins to run with the tort or activity leading 
thereto, not when the injured party can ascertain the damages. 
See Obrav v. Malmberq, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) 
(damages resulting from an intentional tort need not be shown, 
except nominally, for statute of limitations to commence run-
ning). According to the Larsons' own statements, the Wades' 
tortious conduct occurred prior to the submission of that credi-
tor's plan. The undisputed facts are that Stephen Wade, Inc. 
first submitted a creditor's plan of reorganization in the spring 
of 1983. The creditor's plan was confirmed June 10, 1983. It 
is clear from the undisputed facts that the conduct complained of 
occurred more than four years prior to June 24, 1987. 
Even if the complaint did not specifically state that 
the tortious conduct occurred more than four years prior to the 
Larsons' filing their complaint, the claims would still be barred 
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by the statute of limitations. Many courts hold that when a tort 
claim arises directly from a contractual relationship, the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run at the time the contract was 
breached. Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567, 
572 (Mont. 1990). The rationale for the rule is as follows: 
First, the breach itself is actionable and it encour-
ages the party to act within [the period of limita-
tions] of an actionable breach rather than to delay 
until damages increase. The rule also recognizes that 
plaintiff has chosen to deal with the defendant and 
that a contract may be stated in terms to minimize 
losses from defective performance. 
Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 43 111. 
App. 3d 765, 357 N.E. 2d 621, 624 (1976), aff'd sub nom West 
American Insurance Co. v. Sal E Lobianco & Son Co., 69 111.2d 
126, 370 N.E.2d 804 (1977). 
The torts alleged by the Larsons arose directly from 
the alleged contractual relationship with the Wades. As dis-
cussed above, the statute of limitations for breach of the oral 
contract commenced running prior to June 10, 1983. The statute 
of limitations for the torts alleged in the second and third 
causes of action also commenced running prior to June 10, 1983, 
and had therefore run prior to June 24, 1987, the date the 
Larsons filed their action. 
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III. THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT 
COURT. 
The Larsons1 argument that the Larsons should have been 
required to answer by reason of Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) and 9(h) is 
without merit. The purpose of the requirement in Rule 9(h) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that a responsive pleading 
specify the statute of limitations upon which a party relies is 
to give the opposing party adequate notice. In the instant case, 
the memorandum supporting the Wades' motion specified the Wades' 
theory and applicable statutes. The Larsons cannot claim that 
they were not apprised of the statutory provisions upon which the 
Wades based their defense. Rule 8(c) requires a defendant to 
specify affirmative defenses when answering. The Wades have yet 
to even file an answer and therefore, are not subject to waiver 
2/ 
arguments under Rules 8(c) and 12(h).— 
In addition, the trial court treated the Wades motion 
as a motion for summary judgment to be "disposed of as provided 
A defendant who answers but fails to include an affirmative 
defense waives the defense and may not assert it later. 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 
1983); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Pratt v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 
294, 298 (Utah 1977) aff'd on reh'g, 569 P.2d 1112 (1977). 
See also W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 
264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970)(defendant who filed answer not 
raising statute of frauds could not do so through motion). 
The Wades cannot have waived their limitations defense 
because they have yet to file an answer. 
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in Rule 56". Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Rule 56(b) permits a 
defendant to file a motion for summary judgment "at any time", 
even prior to answering. I^d. 56(b). Even if the district court 
had not treated the Wades' motion as one for summary judgment, 
the Larsons hypertechnical procedural argument should not pre-
vail. Courts in several jurisdictions allow defendants who have 
not answered to raise statute of limitations defenses by motion. 
E.g., Dicenso v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 131 Ariz. 605, 643 
P.2d 701 (1982); Beckman v. Chamberlain, 673 P.2d 480 (Mont. 
1983). Wright & Miller also state that the rules should be 
construed to allow a party to move to dismiss based on the 
statute of limitations: 
[T]he courts appear to be wise in overlooking formal 
distinctions between affirmative defenses and motions, 
which have their primary justification in history 
rather than logic. 
5 Wright & Miller, Federal Civil Procedure S 1277 (1990 ed.). 
The Larsons cannot seriously contend that the Wades 
waived their statute of limitations defense by filing a motion 
attacking the sufficiency of the complaint. Such an argument 
elevates form over substance. The district court's order should 
be affirmed. 
24 
IV. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE CREDITOR'S PLAN OF REORGANIZATION 
IS NOT RELEVANT. 
The Larsons have asked the court to "supplement" the 
record on appeal to introduce pleadings from the Larson Ford Sale 
bankruptcy. On February 13, 1991, the court denied the motion to 
supplement the record without prejudice. The Larsons argue that 
the Wades did not introduce the bankruptcy papers because they 
3/ 
would create a question of fact.— As discussed in point I 
above, according to the Larsons' own statements in their amended 
complaint, the submission of the creditor's plan "violated the 
contract." Amended Complaint 1117; R. 17. Thus, the breach of 
contract and tortious conduct occurred prior to or concurrent 
with the filing of the creditor's plan of reorganization The 
effective date of the plan and its implementation are not rele-
vant. The Larsons' claims are barred by the statutes of limita-
tion because the creditor's plan of reorganization was submitted 
or filed, and also confirmed, more than four years prior to the 
Larsons initiating their action. 
CONCLUSION 
The facial allegations of the complaint, coupled with 
the uncontroverted fact that the creditor's plan of reorganiza-
tion in the Larson Ford Sales bankruptcy was confirmed June 10, 
3/ The Larsons offer no explanation for their own failure to 
submit the bankruptcy papers to the district court. 
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1983, establish as a matter of law that the claims asserted by 
the Larsons are barred by the statutes of limitation. The court 
should affirm the district court's order. 
DATED this QA ^ ^VV day of February, 1991. 
Jer 7 ^ 
Douglas J^ Payne 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Respondents 
26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused * true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to be mailed, postage pre-
paid, this s/-^C£~ day of February, 1991 to the following: 
L. Edward Robbins, Esq. 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-._ i 
DJPs012891a ^ " ^ " " 
27 
